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  Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the conduct and performance of U.S. 
monetary policy during the 1990s, comparing it to policy during 
the previous several decades.  It reaches four broad 
conclusions.  First, the macroeconomic performance of the 1990s 
was exceptional, especially if judged by the volatility of 
growth, unemployment, and inflation.  Second, much of the good 
performance was due to good luck arising from the supply-side of 
the economy: Food and energy prices were well behaved, and 
productivity growth experienced an unexpected acceleration.  
Third, monetary policymakers deserve some of the credit by 
making interest rates more responsive to inflation than was the 
case in previous periods.  Fourth, although the 1990s can be 
viewed as an example of successful discretionary policy, Fed 
policymakers may have been engaged in "covert inflation 
targeting" at a rate of about 3 percent.  The avoidance of an 
explicit policy rule, however, means that future policymakers 
inherit only a limited legacy.  
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"I'm baffled.  I find it hard to believe....What I'm 
puzzled about is whether, and if so how, they suddenly 
learned how to regulate the economy.  Does Alan Greenspan 
have an insight into movements in the economy and the 
shocks that other people don't have?" 
 
Milton Friedman, May 2000 
 
 
No aspect of U.S. policy in the 1990s is more widely hailed 
as a success than monetary policy.  Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan 
is often viewed as a miracle worker.  Many Americans share the 
admiration that Senator John McCain expressed during his 
presidential bid.  When the senator was asked about Greenspan's 
conduct of monetary policy, McCain said that if anything were to 
happen to the Fed chairman, as president he would take the 
strategy followed in the movie Weekend at Bernie's: He would 
prop up the chairman's body, give him some sunglasses, and keep 
him on the job as long as possible. 
Greenspan's tenure at the Fed has had its share of historic 
events, impinging on (as well as being affected by) the stance 
of monetary policy.  In October 19, 1987, two months after 
Greenspan took office, the stock market fell 22 percent--a one- 
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day plunge larger than anything seen before or since.  The Fed 
reacted by flooding the economy with liquidity, lowering 
interest rates and averting a recession.  But soon inflation 
became the more pressing concern, and the Fed started raising 
interest rates.  The federal funds rate rose from 6.7 percent in 
November 1987 to 9.8 percent in May 1989.  This Fed tightening, 
together with other factors, pushed the economy into a recession 
the following year.  More than any other single event, the 
recession set the stage for the economic policies of the 1990s: 
It helped Bill Clinton, a little-known governor from Arkansas, 
defeat George Bush, an incumbent president who, only a short 
time earlier, had enjoyed overwhelming popularity following the 
Gulf War. 
The Clinton years brought their own challenges to monetary 
policymakers.  International financial crises in Mexico in 1994-
95 and in Asia in 1997-98, as well as the infamous failure of 
the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, put the 
world financial system in jeopardy and the Fed at center stage. 
 At the same time, the push for fiscal discipline, which turned 
the U.S. government budget from deficit to surplus, made the 
Fed's job easier.  So did the acceleration of productivity 
growth, which most analysts attribute to the advances in 
information technology associated with the so-called "new  
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economy."  Another (perhaps related) development was a gradual 
decline in the U.S. unemployment rate, without the inflationary 
pressures that normally accompany such a change.  Explaining 
this happy but surprising shift, and deciding how to respond to 
it, remains a topic of debate among students and practitioners 
of monetary policy. 
The purpose of this paper is to look back at these events.  
My goal is not to tell the story of U.S. monetary policy during 
the 1990s: Bob Woodward's widely read book, Maestro, already 
does that.  Instead, I offer an analytic review of monetary 
policy during this period, which should complement more 
narrative treatments of the topic. 
I proceed as follows.  Section 1 compares the macroeconomic 
performance of the 1990s to other recent decades.  Section 2 
considers whether some of the good performance of the 1990s can 
be attributed to good luck rather than good policy.  Section 3 
examines how policy was different from earlier decades.  Section 
4 considers the legacy that the monetary policy of the 1990s 
leaves for the future.  Section 5 summarizes the conclusions 
from this experience. 
 
1. The Macroeconomic Performance of the 1990s 
I begin by comparing the performance of the economy during  
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1990s with other recent decades.  To do this, I concentrate on 
three standard time series: inflation, unemployment, and real 
growth.  Economists, policymakers, and pundits watch these 
measures of the economy's performance more than any others.  
This is for good reason: If a nation enjoys low and stable 
inflation, low and stable unemployment, and high and stable 
growth, the fundamentals are in place to permit prosperity for 
most of its citizens. 
 
1.1 The Level and Stability of Inflation 
Inflation is the first piece of data to look at, in part 
because a central banker's first job is to keep inflation in 
check.  There is no doubt that central bankers also influence 
unemployment and real growth and that they do (and should) keep 
an eye on these variables as well.  But according to standard 
theories of monetary policy, central-bank actions have only a 
transitory effect on unemployment and real growth.  By contrast, 
the effects of monetary policy on inflation continue in the long 
run--and indeed are strongest in the long run.  So, if monetary 
policymakers take a long view of their actions, inflation is 
their first order of concern. 
Table 1 shows the performance of inflation during the 1990s 
and the preceding four decades.  The first row shows average  
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inflation for each of the decades.  The second row shows the 
standard deviation, which is a common measure of volatility. 
As judged by the average inflation rate, the 1990s were not 
exceptional.  Inflation was lower in the 1950s and 1960s than it 
was in the 1990s.   For those with shorter memories, however, 
the 1990s can be viewed as a low-inflation decade.  There was 
substantially less inflation in the 1990s than there was in the 
1980s and especially the 1970s. 
This decline in inflation is largely the result of the tough 
disinflationary policies that Paul Volcker put into place in the 
early 1980s: Inflation fell from a peak of 14.8 percent in March 
1980 to 3.6 percent three years later.  As is almost always the 
case, this large and persistent decline in inflation was 
associated with temporarily declining production and rising 
unemployment.  By most measures, the recession of the early 
1980s was the most severe economic downturn since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. 
The 1990s look more exceptional once we look at the standard 
deviation of inflation.  The second row of Table 1 shows that 
inflation was far more stable during the 1990s than during any 
other recent decade.  The differences are substantial in 
magnitude.  Inflation was only one-third as volatile during the 
1990s as it was during the 1980s.  It was 24 percent less  
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volatile during the 1990s than it was during the 1960s, the 
second-best decade as ranked by inflation volatility.  There is 
no doubt that by historical standards the 1990s were a decade of 
remarkably stable inflation. 
Another way to look at the data is to examine how bad 
inflation was at its worst.  The third line of Table 1 shows the 
highest annual inflation rate recorded over the 120 months of 
each decade.  By this measure, inflation was lowest in the 1960s 
and 1990s.  But there is an important difference between these 
two periods.  In the 1960s, the highest inflation rate occurred 
at the end of the decade, representing the beginning of a 
problem that would persist into the 1970s.  By contrast, in the 
1990s, inflation peaked at the beginning of the decade and 
thereafter became tame.  After January 1992, inflation remained 
in a remarkably narrow range from 1.34 percent to 3.32 percent.   
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Table 1: 
The Inflation Experience, Decade by Decade 
 
 
1950s  1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
 
Average 
Inflation       2.07   2.33   7.09   5.66   3.00 
 
Standard 
Deviation       2.44   1.48   2.72   3.53   1.12 
of Inflation 
 
Maximum       9.36   6.20  13.29  14.76   6.29 
Inflation 
 
Date of  




Note: In this and subsequent tables, the decade of the 1950s 
refers to the period from the first month (or quarter) of 1950 
to last month (or quarter) of 1959, and so on.  Inflation is the 
rate of change in the consumer price index over the previous 12 
months.   
 
Source: Department of Labor and author's calculations. 
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1.2 Judging the Inflation Experience 
These comparisons of inflation over the past five decades 
bring up a classic question of economic theory: What costs does 
inflation impose on a society?  Or, to focus the issue for the 
purposes at hand, is it more important for the central bank to 
produce low inflation or stable inflation?  If low average 
inflation is the goal, then the monetary policymakers of the 
1990s can be given only an average grade.  But if stable 
inflation is the goal, then they go to the top of the class. 
Textbook discussions of the costs of inflation emphasize 
both the level and stability of inflation.  A high level of 
inflation is costly for several reasons: (1) Because inflation 
raises the costs of holding money, it diverts people's time and 
attention toward conserving their money holdings and away from 
more productive uses. (2) Inflation induces firms to incur more 
"menu costs"--the costs associated with changing prices and 
distributing the new prices to salesmen and customers.  (3) 
Because price adjustment is staggered, inflation induces 
spurious volatility in the prices of some firms relative to 
others, which impedes the price system's ability to allocate 
resources efficiently. (4) Because the tax laws are not indexed, 
inflation raises the effective tax on capital income and thereby 
discourages capital accumulation and economic growth. (5)  
  9 
Inflation makes economic calculation more difficult, because the 
currency is less reliable as a yardstick for measuring value.   
All five of these costs indicate that low average inflation 
is desirable, but they suggest that the stability of inflation 
matters as well.  Standard theory implies that these costs of 
inflation are "convex," meaning that the cost of incremental 
inflation rises with inflation itself.  In other words, an 
increase in inflation from 4 to 6 percent is worse than an 
increase from 2 to 4 percent.  If this is so, then these five 
benefits to low inflation also argue for stable inflation.  The 
cost of steady 4-percent inflation is less than the average cost 
of inflation that fluctuates back and forth between 2 and 6. 
In addition to these five costs, there is another cost 
associated directly with inflation volatility: (6) Because an 
unexpected change in the price level redistributes real wealth 
between debtors and creditors, highly volatile inflation creates 
unnecessary risk for all parties.  As people avoid try to avoid 
these risks, long-term contracts using money as the unit of 
account become less tenable. 
Although these six costs of inflation are widely accepted 
among economists, there is debate about whether the costs are 
large or small in total, and which are larger than others.  
Moreover, there is little direct evidence of convexity in the  
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costs of inflation.  As a result, it is hard to compare 
quantitatively the benefits of low inflation with the benefits 
of stable inflation.  The more weight is given to inflation 
stability as a policy objective, the more exceptional the 
monetary policy of the 1990s appears.  
 
1.3 Two Arguments in Favor of Inflation 
Some economists argue that there are some benefits to 
inflation, at least if the inflation is only moderate.  These 
arguments are worth noting, in part because they are associated 
with some prominent policymakers of the 1990s.   
In particular, long before he was U.S. Secretary Treasury, 
Lawrence Summers (1991) wrote, "the optimal inflation rate is 
surely positive, perhaps as high or 2 or 3 percent."  Although 
Summers has never had direct control over monetary policy, Fed 
policymakers are well aware of the views of prominent Treasury 
officials.  Moreover, nations that have adopted a policy of 
inflation targeting (which were numerous during the 1990s) have 
typically chosen a positive number, rather than zero, for their 
target.  In this environment, claims that the Fed is aiming for 
"price stability" should perhaps not be taken too literally.  
The 3 -percent inflation experienced during the 1990s may be 
close to the target policymakers had in mind.  
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1.3.1 The Possibility of Negative Real Interest Rates 
One argument for a target rate of inflation greater than 
zero is that it permits real interest rates (that is, interest 
rates corrected for inflation) to become negative.  Because 
individuals can always hold cash rather than bonds, it is 
impossible for nominal interest rates to fall below zero.  Under 
zero inflation, real interest rates also can never become 
negative.  But if inflation is, say, 3 percent, then the central 
bank can lower the nominal rate toward zero and send the real 
interest toward negative 3 percent.  The ability to produce 
negative real interest rates gives the central bank more 
latitude to stimulate the economy in a recession.  
Some economists point to Japan in the 1990s as an example of 
why some inflation is desirable.  With inflation at about zero 
and nominal interest rates at zero, the Bank of Japan appears to 
have had little room to stimulate the economy.  Japan is said to 
have been stuck in a "liquidity trap" when monetary policy loses 
its effectiveness.  If Japan had inherited a tradition of more 
inflation, the argument goes, then when the Bank lowered nominal 
rates to zero, real rates would have become negative.  A 
negative real rate would have stimulated spending and helped 
pull the economy out of its lingering recession.  
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This line of reasoning is controversial.  Some economists 
dispute the claim that Japan was stuck in a liquidity trap.  
They argue that more aggressive Japanese monetary expansion 
would have lowered real rates by raising inflation expectations 
or that it would have stimulated exports by causing the yen to 
depreciate in foreign exchange markets.   
Nonetheless, this argument for positive inflation may well 
have influenced U.S. monetary policy during the 1990s.  Lawrence 
Summers endorsed this argument at the beginning the decade.  
Moreover, the Japanese experience in the aftermath of its stock 
market and real estate bubble was a warning flag of what might 
happen in the United States if the booming stock market were 
ever to suffer a similar collapse.  The 3-percent inflation rate 
gave Fed policymakers the option to stimulate spending with 
negative real interest rates, if the need should ever have 
arisen. 
 
1.3.2 Greasing The Wheels of Labor Markets 
A second argument for moderate inflation starts with the 
observation that cuts in nominal wages are rare.  For some 
reason, firms are reluctant to cut their workers' nominal wages, 
and workers are reluctant to accept such cuts.  A 2-percent wage 
cut in a zero-inflation world is, in real terms, the same as a  
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3-percent raise with 5-percent inflation, but workers do not 
always see it that way.  The 2-percent wage cut may seem like an 
insult, whereas the 3 -percent raise is, after all, still a 
raise.  Empirical studies confirm that nominal wages rarely 
fall. 
This fact suggests that inflation may make labor markets 
work better.  Here's the argument.  The supply and demand for 
different kinds of labor is always changing.  Sometimes an 
increase in supply or decrease in demand leads to a fall in the 
equilibrium real wage for a group of workers.  If nominal wages 
can't be cut, then the only way to cut real wages is to allow 
inflation to do the job.  Without inflation, the real wage will 
be stuck above the equilibrium level, resulting in higher 
unemployment.  
For this reason, some economists argue that inflation 
"greases the wheels" of labor markets.  Only a little inflation 
is needed: An inflation rate of 2 percent lets real wages fall 
by 2 percent per year, or 20 percent per decade, without cuts in 
nominal wages.  Such automatic reductions in real wages are 
impossible with zero inflation. 
There is reason to suspect that this argument for positive 
inflation also influenced U.S. monetary policy in the 1990s.  
Once again, Lawrence Summers endorsed this view at the beginning  
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of the decade when he proposed a target rate of inflation of 2 
to 3 percent.  Subsequently, the case was advanced by a 
Brookings research team that included George Akerlof, husband to 
Janet Yellen, a Clinton appointee to the Federal Reserve.
1  These 
facts suggest that some U.S. monetary policymakers during the 
1990s may have been skeptical about the desirability of pushing 
inflation all the way down to zero.  The 3-percent inflation 
realized during this period may have been exactly what they were 
aiming for. 
 
1.4  Real Economic Performance: Unemployment and Growth 
The other key aspect of macroeconomic performance beyond 
inflation is the real economy, which is most often monitored by 
unemployment and growth in real GDP.  Keep in mind that monetary 
policy is not the most important determinant of these economic 
variables.  Indeed, according to standard theory, the Fed has no 
ability at all to influence unemployment and real growth in the 
long run.   
What determines the long-run rates of unemployment and real 
growth?  Unemployment is determined by labor-market features, 
institutions, and policies, such as the demographic structure of 
the work force, the bargaining power of unions, minimum-wage 
laws, unemployment-insurance policies, and the mechanisms  
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available for matching workers and jobs.  These factors also 
influence real economic growth (for lower unemployment means 
higher production), but the primary determinant of real economic 
growth in the long run is the rate of technological progress.  
Notice that when discussing the long-run forces setting 
unemployment and real growth, monetary policy is far in the 
background. 
Yet monetary policy influences unemployment and growth in 
the short run.  What the "short run" means is a subject of some 
dispute, but most economists agree that the central-bank actions 
influence these variables over a period of at least two or three 
years.  This means that the central bank can potentially help 
stabilize the economy. (And if policy  is badly run, it can 
destabilize it--the Great Depression of the 1930s being a 
prominent example). In the jargon of economics, monetary policy 
is neutral in the long run, but not in the short run.  The 
practical implications of this textbook theory are the 
following: The average levels of unemployment and growth over 
long periods are beyond the central bank's powers, but the 
volatility of these series from year to year is something it can 
influence. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on unemployment and real 
growth for each of the last five decades of the twentieth  
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century. It presents both the average level over the decade and 
the standard deviation as a measure of volatility. 
As the table shows, the average level of unemployment during 
the 1990s was lower than it was during the previous two decades 
(although still higher than 1950s and 1960s).  There is no 
consensus among economists on the reasons for this decline in 
the normal level of unemployment.  It could, for instance, be 
related to the aging of the work force, as the baby boom reaches 
middle age.  Older workers tend to have more stable jobs than 
younger workers, so it is natural to expect declining 
unemployment as the work force ages.  Alternatively, as I 
discuss later, the decline in normal unemployment during the 
1990s could be related to the acceleration in productivity 
growth due to advances in information technology.  But whatever 
the cause for the long-run decline in unemployment, few 
economists would credit monetary policy. 
Data on real economic growth shows that average growth 
during the 1990s was similar to that experienced during the 
1980s and substantially lower than that experienced during the 
1950s and 1960s.  This fact might seem surprising in light of 
the great hoopla surrounding the so-called "new economy."  The 
explanation is that the acceleration of economic growth occurred 
in the middle of the decade.  Once the rapid growth in the  
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second half of the decade is averaged with the recession and 
slow growth in the first half, overall growth during the 1990s 
is no longer impressive. 
What's important for evaluating monetary policy, however, 
are not the averages in Table 2 but the standard deviations.  
Here the numbers tell a striking story: Unemployment and 
economic growth were more stable during the 1990s than during 
any recent decade.  The change in the volatility of GDP growth 
is large.  The economy's production was 27 percent less volatile 
during the 1990s than it was during the 1960s, the second most 
stable decade.  
These statistics suggest amazing success by monetary 
policymakers during the 1990s.  As we saw earlier, the economy 
enjoyed low volatility in inflation.  One might wonder whether 
this success came at a cost.  That is, did the Fed achieve 
stable inflation by giving less weight to the goals of stable 
employment and growth?  The answer appears to be no: The economy 
became more stable in every dimension.  
Of course, improvement in economic stabilization does not 
necessarily mean that policymakers are doing a better job.  
Perhaps they were just lucky.  
  18 
Table 2: 
Unemployment and Real Economic Growth, Decade by Decade 
 




Average       4.51   4.78   6.22      7.27   5.76 
 
Standard 
Deviation       1.29    1.07    1.16   1.48   1.05 
 
 
Real GDP growth 
 
Average       4.18   4.43   3.28   3.02   3.03 
 
Standard  




Note: Unemployment is the monthly seasonally-adjusted percentage 
of the labor force without a job.  Real GDP growth is the growth 
rate of inflation-adjusted gross domestic product from four 
quarters earlier. 
 
Source: Department of Labor, Department of Commerce, and 
author's calculations.  
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2. The Role of Luck 
The Fed's job is to respond to shocks to the economy in 
order to stabilize output, employment, and inflation.  Standard 
analyses of economic fluctuations divide shocks into two types. 
 Demand shocks are those that alter the overall demand for goods 
and services.  Supply shocks are those that alter the prices at 
which firms are willing and able to supply goods and services.   
Demand shocks are the easier type for the Fed to handle 
because, like monetary policy, they push output, employment, and 
inflation in the same direction.  A stock market crash, for 
instance, reduces aggregate demand, putting downward pressure on 
output, employment, and inflation.  The standard response is for 
the Fed to lower interest rates by increasing the money supply. 
 If well timed, such an action can restore aggregate demand and 
offset the effects of the shock on both inflation and the real 
economy. 
Supply shocks pose a more difficult problem.  An increase in 
the world price of oil, for instance, raises firms' costs and 
the prices they charge.  This tends to raise inflation and, for 
given aggregate demand, push the economy toward recession.  The 
Fed then has a choice between contracting policy to fight 
inflation and expanding policy to fight recession.  In the face 
of supply shocks, the Fed cannot stabilize inflation and the  
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real economy simultaneously.  Supply shocks force upon the Fed a 
tradeoff between inflation stability and employment stability. 
Yet during the 1990s the U.S. economy enjoyed stability of 
both kinds.  One possible reason is dumb luck.  Perhaps the 
economy just did not experience the supply shocks that caused so 
much turmoil in earlier decades. 
 
2.1 Food and Energy Price Shocks 
The most significant supply shocks in recent U.S. history 
are the food and energy shocks of the 1970s.  These shocks are 
often blamed as one proximate cause of the rise in inflation 
that occurred during this decade not only in the United States 
but also around the world.  So a natural place to start looking 
for supply shocks is in the prices of food and energy.
2 
Table 3 shows some summary statistics on these shocks.  They 
are measured here as CPI inflation minus core inflation, where 
core inflation is based on the consumer price index excluding 
food and energy.  This measure is positive when food and energy 
prices are rising relative to other prices in the economy. 
The first two rows of the table show the average shock and 
the standard deviation of the shocks in each decade.  The 1990s 
were lucky time.  The low standard deviation shows that large 
supply shocks were not common.  Moreover, the negative value for  
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the average shock indicates that good shocks were more common 
than bad shocks.  
The third row of the table shows the worst shock that the 
Fed had to deal with during each decade.  Not surprisingly, the 
worst shock in the entire period was in the 1970s: Because of 
adverse shocks to food and energy, C PI inflation rose 4.64 
percentage points more than core inflation during the twelve 
months ending February 1974.  By contrast, the worst shock of 
the 1990s was less than one-fourth as large.  This shock 
occurred in 1990 as a result of the Gulf War.  For the rest of 
the decade, there was no adverse food and energy shock as large 
as a full percentage point. 
Given these data, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
the macroeconomic success of the 1990s was in part due to luck. 
 Food and energy prices were unusually well behaved, and the 
economy reaped the benefit of this stability.  
  22 
Table 3 
Food and Energy Price Shocks, Decade by Decade 
 
 
1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
 
Average 
Shock        -0.12   0.61  -0.51  -0.22 
 
Standard 
Deviation         0.45   1.41   0.97   0.50 
of Shocks 
 
Worst Shock       1.34   4.65   2.26   1.02 
 
Date of Worst Shock     Feb 66   Feb 74   Mar 80   Oct 90 
 
 
Note: The shock here is measured as the CPI inflation rate over 
12 months minus the core CPI inflation rate over the same 
period.  The core CPI is the index excluding food and energy.   
 
Source: Department of Labor and author's calculations. 
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2.2 Productivity 
Another potential source of supply shocks is the rate of 
technological advance.  This is a natural hypothesis to explain 
the good macroeconomic performance of the 1990s.  During these 
years there was much discussion of the so-called "new economy" 
and the increasing role of information technology. 
Table 4 shows data on the productivity growth in the nonfarm 
business sector.  The pickup in productivity growth is evident 
in these data.  It is even clearer if the 1990s are split in 
half: Productivity growth was higher in the second half of the 
decade than in the first.  While the productivity speed-up is a 
fortuitous development, its importance should not be overstated. 
 Compared to the data from the 1950s and 1960s, the average rate 
of productivity growth during the 1990s is not unusual. 
What is more anomalous is the low volatility of productivity 
growth, as shown in the second row of the table.  To the extent 
that productivity reflects technological progress, the 1990s 
were a decade of smooth advances in technology.  It is possible 
that this might explain the low volatility in other 
macroeconomic variables.  Yet it is also possible that the tame 
business cycle led to low volatility in productivity, rather 
than the other way around. 
The productivity data suggest an intriguing observation: The  
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1990s were in many ways the opposite of the 1970s.  The 1970s 
saw a large increase in the price of a major intermediate good--
oil.  At the same time, productivity growth decelerated, while 
unemployment and inflation rose.  The 1990s saw a large decrease 
in the price of a major intermediate good--computer chips.  At 
the same time, productivity growth accelerated, while 
unemployment and inflation fell.   
Economists do not fully understand the links among 
productivity, unemployment, and inflation, but one hypothesis 
may help explain the 1990s.  If workers' wage demands lag behind 
news about productivity, accelerating productivity may tend to 
lower the natural rate of unemployment until workers' 
aspirations catch up.  If the central bank is unaware of the 
falling natural rate of unemployment, it may leave more slack in 
the economy than it realizes, putting downward pressure on 
inflation.  Thus, even if the average rate of productivity 
growth was not exceptional during the 1990s, the surprising 
acceleration from the poor productivity growth of the 1970s and 
1980s may have acted like a lucky shock to aggregate supply.
3  
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Table 4: 
Productivity Growth, Decade by Decade 
 
 
1950s  1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
 
Average 








Note: Productivity growth is the quarterly change in output per 
hour in the nonfarm business sector, expressed at an annual 
rate. 
 
Source: Department of Commerce and author's calculations. 
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2.3  The Stock Market 
It would be an oversight in any discussion of luck in the 
1990s to neglect the stock market.  For investors in the stock 
market, this decade was extraordinarily lucky. 
Table 5 shows the average return and the standard deviation 
of returns for each of the past five decades.  It also shows the 
ratio of the average return to the standard deviation, which is 
commonly used as a measure of how much reward an investor gets 
for taking on risk.  The table shows that the 1990s were 
exceptional.  Returns were high, and volatility was low.   There 
was never a better time to be in the market. 
To a large extent, the performance of the stock market is 
just a reflection of the macroeconomic events we have already 
seen in other statistics.  Low volatility in the stock market 
reflects low volatility in the overall economy.  The high return 
reflects the surprising acceleration in productivity growth, 
which helped fuel growth in corporate profits.  If the stock 
market is merely a mirror being held up to the economy, then it 
has little independent role in the conduct or analysis of 
monetary policy. 
There are, however, two reasons why the stock market may 
have a role to play.  The first is that the stock market may be 
an indicator of things to come.  According to the "efficient  
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markets" theory, stock-market investors are rationally looking 
ahead to future economic conditions and constantly processing 
all relevant information.  Thus, news about the economy might 
show up first in the stock market.  The 1990s are a case in 
point.  The bull market preceded the acceleration in 
productivity growth by several years, suggesting the possibility 
that Wall Street knew about the "new economy" long before it 
showed up in standard macroeconomic statistics. 
A second reason why the stock market may be relevant to 
monetary policy is that it can be a driving force of the 
business cycle.  John Maynard Keynes suggested that movements in 
the market are driven by the "animal spirits" of investors.  
Alan Greenspan reprised this idea during the 1990s when he 
questioned whether investors were suffering from "irrational 
exuberance."  Such exuberance could push stock prices higher 
than their fundamental value and make households feel richer 
than they truly are.   
Under either theory, monetary policymakers might react to a 
rise in the stock market by setting interest rates higher than 
they otherwise would.  This is the other side of the coin to the 
Fed's policy in October 1987, when it responded to a stock 
market crash by increasing liquidity and cutting interest rates. 
 Regardless of whether the movements in the stock market are  
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rational, they alter the aggregate demand for goods and 
services, which make them of interest to monetary policymakers. 
 Indeed, the decline in the personal saving rate during the 
1990s was mostly due to the booming stock market, for the 
"wealth effect" was a potent stimulus to consumer spending.   
Of course, saying that monetary policy might react to the 
stock market is different from saying that it did.  As I discuss 
below, there is scant evidence that the booming stock market of 
the 1990s played a large, independent role in monetary policy 
during this period.   
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Table 5: 
Stock Market Returns, Decade by Decade 
 
 
      1950s   1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
 
Average 




of Return      15.88  12.30  16.36  17.09  12.04 
 
Ratio of   




Note: Calculations are based on monthly data on total returns on 
the S&P 500 index over the previous 12 months.   
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3. The Role of Policy 
Let's now turn to looking directly at policy to see how, if 
at all, it was different in the 1990s than in earlier decades.  
I look at two standard gauges of monetary policy--the money 
supply and interest rates. 
Before doing so, let's clear up a potential confusion.  
Although a central bank can control both the money supply and 
the level of interest rates, it would be wrong to view these two 
variables as distinct policy instruments.  The reason is that 
the central bank influences interest rates by a djusting the 
money supply.  In essence, interest rates are the price of 
money.  The central bank affects the price of money by 
controlling the quantity of money.   
As a first approximation, the central bank's only policy 
lever is the supply of high-powered money (currency plus bank 
reserves), which it controls through open-market operations and, 
to a lesser extent, lending at its discount window.  It can use 
this single lever to target a broad monetary aggregate, such as 
M1 or M2, an interest rate, an exchange rate, or the price of 
bananas.  But once it chooses one intermediate target, the game 
is over: The central bank has used up its power over economic 
conditions. 
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3.1. The Demise of Monetary Aggregates 
There once was a time when critics of Fed policy thought the 
key to good monetary policy was stable growth in the money 
supply.  If the Fed would only keep M1 or M2 growing at a low, 
stable rate, the argument went, the economy would avoid high 
inflations, painful deflations, and the major booms and busts of 
the business cycle.  Milton Friedman was the most prominent 
proponent of this so-called "monetarist" view. 
It is easy to see how such a viewpoint arose.  The two most 
painful macroeconomic events of the twentieth century were the 
Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Inflation of the 
1970s.  Both calamities would likely have been avoided if the 
Fed had been following the Friedman prescription of low, stable 
money growth.   
In the early 1930s, high-powered money continued to grow at 
a moderate rate, but the collapse of the banking system caused 
broader measures of the money supply to plunge.  Worries about 
bank solvency caused households to hold more money in the form 
of currency rather than demand deposits and banks to hold more 
deposits in the form of reserves rather than bank loans.  Both 
actions reduced the amount of bank lending; the creation of 
inside money by the banking system went in reverse.  As measured 
by currency plus demand deposits, the quantity of money fell by  
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25 percent from 1929 to 1933.  If the Fed has been committed to 
stable growth in the broader monetary aggregates, it would have 
pursued a more expansionary policy than it did, and the Great 
Depression would have been less severe. 
Generals are said to often make the mistake of fighting the 
last war, and the same may be true of central bankers.  Perhaps 
because of the memory of its insufficient expansion during the 
1930s, the Fed was too expansionary during the 1970s.  The 
proximate cause of the Great Inflation was not monetary policy: 
The fiscal expansion due to the Vietnam War in the late 1960s 
and the OPEC oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-81 deserve much of 
the blame.  But monetary policy accommodated these shocks to a 
degree that ensured persistent high inflation.  The money supply 
grew rapidly throughout the 1970s, and inflation reached some of 
its highest levels on record.  How best to handle supply shocks 
is a topic about which economists disagree. But there is no 
doubt that if Fed had kept money growth to a slower rate during 
the 1970s, it would have better contained the inflationary 
pressures. 
With these two formative episodes as the historical 
background, one might have expected subsequent improvements in 
monetary policy to be associated with increased concern at the 
Fed to maintain low, stable money growth.  Indeed, increased  
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reliance on target ranges for the monetary aggregates was 
allegedly part of Paul Volcker's 1979 change in the direction of 
monetary policy, which helped set the stage for the 1990s.
4  If 
the improved macroeconomic performance of the 1990s went hand in 
hand with greater stability in the money supply, monetarists 
could have claimed intellectual victory. 
Alas, it was not to be.  Table 6 shows the average growth 
rate and the standard deviation of the growth rate for M1 and 
M2, the two most commonly used measures of the money supply. (I 
omit the 1950s here because the Fed's consistent data on 
monetary aggregates start in 1959.)  One clear fact is that the 
1990s saw slower money growth than the 1970s and 1980s.  The 
basic lesson of the quantity theory of money--that slower money 
growth and lower inflation go hand in hand--receives ample 
support from this decade. 
Yet the data give no support for the monetarist view that 
stability in the monetary aggregates is a prerequisite for 
economic stability.  The standard deviation of M2 growth was not 
unusually low during the 1990s, and the standard deviation of M1 
growth was the highest of the past four decades.  In other 
words, while the nation was enjoying macroeconomic tranquility, 
the money supply was exhibiting high volatility. 
From the standpoint of economic theory, this is not a  
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puzzle.  The money supply is one determinant of the overall 
demand for goods and services in the economy, but there are many 
others, such as consumer confidence, investor psychology, and 
the health of the banking system.  The view that monetary 
stability is the only ingredient needed for economic stability 
is based on a narrow view of what causes the ups and downs of 
the business cycle.  In the end, it's a view that is hard to 
reconcile with the data. 
This lesson was not lost on monetary policymakers during the 
1990s. In February 1993, Fed chairman Alan Greenspan announced 
that the Fed would pay less attention to the monetary aggregates 
than it  had in the past.  The aggregates, he said, "do not 
appear to be giving reliable indications of economic 
developments and price pressures."
5  It's easy to see why he 
might have reached this conclusion when he did.  Over the 
previous 12 months, M1 had grown at an extremely high 12-percent 
rate, while M2 had grown at an extremely low 0.5-percent rate.  
Depending on how much weight was given to each of these two 
measures, monetary policy was either very loose, very tight, or 
somewhere in between. 
Henceforth, the Fed would conduct policy by setting a target 
for the federal funds rate, the short-term interest rate at 
which banks make loans to one another.  It would adjust the  
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target interest rate in response to changing economic 
conditions, but it would permit the money supply to do whatever 
necessary to keep the interest rate on target.  If the 
subsequent performance of the economy is any guide, this policy 
of ignoring data on the monetary aggregates has proven a 
remarkably effective operating procedure.  
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Table 6: 
Growth in the Money Supply, Decade by Decade 
 
 




Average          3.69   6.35   7.78   3.63 
 
Standard  





Average          7.05   9.49   7.97   4.04 
 
Standard  
Deviation          1.63   3.22   2.29   2.39 
 
 
Note: Calculations are with monthly data.  The growth rate is 
calculated from 12 months earlier. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve and author's calculations.  
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3.2. Interest Rate Policy: The End of the Inflation Spiral 
Choosing the short-term interest rate as an intermediate 
target for Fed policy is only the first step to conducting 
monetary policy.  The next, more difficult step is to decide 
what the target rate should be and how the target should respond 
to changing economic conditions. 
There is a long tradition of concern among economists that a 
central bank's reliance on interest-rate targets could prove 
inflationary.  The argument runs as follows.  Imagine that some 
event--an accidental overheating of the economy, an adverse 
supply shock, or a sudden scare about  impending inflation--
starts to drive up expectations of inflation.  If the central 
bank is targeting the nominal interest rate, the rise in 
expected inflation means an automatic fall in the real interest 
rate.  The fall in the real interest rate stimulates the 
aggregate demand for goods and services, which in turn puts 
upward pressure on prices.  The rise in prices confirms and 
reinforces the inflationary expectations that began the process. 
 Thus, expected inflation begets actual inflation, which in turn 
begets even higher expected inflation.  The central bank, 
committed to its interest-rate target, ends up increasing the 
money supply at an ever more rapid rate.  Inflation spirals out 
of control.  
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Fortunately, there is a simple way to avoid this problem: A 
central bank should raise its interest-rate target in response 
to any inflationary pressure by enough to choke off that 
pressure.  How much is enough?  Economic theory suggests a 
natural benchmark: If the central bank responds to a one-
percentage-point increase in inflation by raising the nominal 
interest rate by more than one percentage point, then the real 
interest rate will rise, cooling off the economy.  In other 
words, it is not sufficient that the central bank raise nominal 
interest rates in response to higher inflation; it is crucial 
that the response be greater than one-for-one. 
These theoretical insights go a long way to explaining the 
success of monetary policy in the 1990s, as well as its failures 
in previous decades.  The first line of Table 7 shows how much 
the federal funds rate typically responds to changes in core 
inflation.  These numbers are based on a simple statistical 
analysis of the data on interest rates, unemployment, and 
inflation (described in the note to the table).   
The key result in this table is that the responsiveness of 
interest rates to inflation has been rising over time.  In 
earlier decades, the response was less than one-for-one.  In the 
1960s, for instance, when inflation rose by 1 percentage point, 
the federal funds rate rose by only 0.69 of a percentage point.  
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 The theory of spiraling inflation may be the right explanation 
for the Great Inflation of the 1970s.   In other words, this 
episode was the result of the inadequate response of interest-
rate policy to the inflationary pressures arising first from the 
Vietnam War and later from the OPEC oil shocks.   
The situation was just the opposite during the 1990s.  Each 
rise in the inflation rate was met by an even larger rise in the 
nominal interest rate.  When inflation rose by 1 percentage 
point, the federal funds rate typically rose by 1.39 percentage 
points.  This substantial response prevented any incipient 
inflation from getting out of control. 
Although the 1990s saw high responsiveness of interest rates 
to inflation, it was not a decade of volatile interest rates.  
The second line in Table 7 shows that the federal funds rate, in 
fact, exhibited low volatility by historical standards.  High 
responsiveness and low volatility may seem a paradoxical 
combination, but they are easy to reconcile: The more the Fed 
responds to inflationary pressures when they arise, the less of 
a problem inflation becomes, and the less it has to respond to 
later. 
Overall, the U.S. experience with monetary policy during the 
1990s teaches a simple lesson.  To maintain stable inflation and 
stable interest rates in the long run, a central bank should  
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raise interest rates substantially in the short run in response 
to any inflationary threat.
6  
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Table 7: 
The Federal Funds Rate, Decade by Decade 
 
1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
 
The typical response 
of the federal funds rate   0.69   0.85   0.88   1.39 
to a 1-percentage point  
increase in core inflation 
 
 
Standard deviation of     1.78   2.54   3.38   1.39 
the federal funds rate 
 
 
Note: These numbers are computed using 120 months of data for 
each decade.  The first line is derived from an ordinary least 
squares regression of the federal funds rate on a constant, the 
unemployment rate, and the core inflation rate over the previous 
12 months; the table reports the coefficient on core inflation. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve, Department of Labor, and author's 
calculations.  
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3.3. A Simple Way to Set Interest Rates Like A Pro 
Consider the following simple formula for setting the 
federal funds rate: 
 
Federal funds rate = 8.5 + 1.4 x (Core inflation - Unemployment) 
 
Here "core inflation" is the CPI inflation rate over the 
previous 12 months excluding food and energy, and "unemployment" 
is the seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate.  For example, if 
core inflation is at 3 percent and unemployment is at 5 percent, 
the federal funds rate should be set at 5.7 percent.  The 
parameters in this formula were chosen to offer the best fit for 
data from the 1990s. 
 
3.3.1. The Case for the Interest Rate Formula 
The logic behind such an interest-rate f ormula is 
straightforward.  The Fed raises interest rates in response to 
higher inflation to cool the economy.  As we just discussed, the 
response is more than one-for-one to avoid spiraling inflation. 
 In addition, the Fed responds to high unemployment by cutting 
interest rates to stimulate aggregate demand.   
There are two reasons why the Fed might want to respond to 
unemployment.  First, employment stability may be a goal in  
  43 
itself.  At times, legislation has been proposed that would give 
the Fed single-minded concern about price stability.  But the 
Fed's actual Congressional mandate has always been much broader. 
Second, unemployment is a leading indicator of future 
inflation.  Low unemployment tends to put upward pressure on 
wages, which in turn raises production costs and the prices of 
goods and services.  Although some observers have suggested that 
the combination of low unemployment and low inflation in the 
late 1990s casts doubt on the "Phillips curve" tradeoff between 
these variables, careful statistical analyses suggest that 
unemployment and related variables are among the most useful 
data for forecasting inflation.
7  Other things equal, a Fed that 
wants to keep inflation in check will respond to low 
unemployment by raising interest rates. 
 
3.3.2 What the Formula Says About Monetary Policy During the 
1990s 
Figure 1 shows the federal funds rate predicted by this 
simple interest-rate formula and the actual federal funds 
beginning from 1958.  Comparing these two series leads to 
several conclusions about the conduct of monetary policy. 
The first, important observation is that during the 1990s, 
the two series in Figure 1 move closely together.  According to  
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a standard measure of goodness of fit (the R
2 statistic), the 
formula explains 85 percent of movements in the federal funds 
rate during this time.  This tight fit has profound implications 
for understanding monetary policy. It means that the interest-
rate policy during the 1990s can be viewed as largely a response 
to the contemporaneous levels of inflation and unemployment.
8 
A corollary to this conclusion is that the many other issues 
that dominated public debate over monetary policy during the 
1990s must be of secondary importance.  The media spent much 
time discussing the Fed chairman's broad interests, including 
the stance of fiscal policy, the "irrational exuberance" of the 
stock market, the productivity gains of the "new economy," the 
financial crises in Mexico and Asia, and sundry obscure economic 
data.  Apparently, these did not exert a great influence over 
interest rates.  If they had, the formula would not be able to 
track actual interest rates so well.   
A second, important observation is that the two series in 
Figure 1 move at about the same time.  There was much discussion 
during the 1990s of the need for the Fed to be preemptive, to 
respond to economic pressures before they showed up in inflation 
and unemployment.  Being preemptive makes sense, if forecasting 
is good enough to make the task feasible, because monetary 
policy influences the economy with a lag typically estimated to  
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be 6 to 12 months.  But the strong contemporaneous correlation 
in Figure 1, and the absence of any tendency for the actual 
interest rate to move before the formula indicates, suggests 
that policy was not in fact preemptive at all.  
 
3.3.3 What the 1990s Teach Us About Earlier Monetary Policy 
Figure 1 can also be used to make some judgments about 
monetary policy of the past.  We can view the interest-rate 
formula as a rough approximation to the Greenspan Fed.  By 
comparing the two series, we can see how the Greenspan Fed might 
have responded to the economic circumstances facing monetary 
policymakers of the past. 
One conclusion is that the Greenspan Fed of the 1990s would 
likely have averted the Great Inflation of the 1970s.  From the 
late 1960s to the early 1970s, the formula interest rate in 
Figure 1 is consistently several percentage points above the 
actual interest rate.  The same is true, to a less extent, in 
the late 1970s.  This is consistent with the result presented in 
Table 7: Fed policymakers of the 1990s responded more to rising 
inflation than did their predecessors. 
A second conclusion from Figure 1 is that the Greenspan Fed 
would have been much more expansionary in the early 1980s.  As 
the economy experienced the deepest recession since the Great  
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Depression, the Fed would have cut interest rates much more 
aggressively.  (Taken literally, the interest-rate formula says 
interest rates should have become negative, which is of course 
impossible.)  The disinflation would have been less rapid, but 
some of the very high unemployment would have been averted.   
 
3.4 The Role of the White House 
So far, this paper has said little about the Clinton 
administration.  In some ways, this is to be expected: Monetary 
policy is made by the Federal Reserve, which is independent of 
the executive branch.  But the administration did influence 
monetary policy in several important ways. 
The most obvious is the reappointment of Alan Greenspan.  In 
retrospect, this decision may seem like a no-brainer, but at the 
time it was less obvious.  When Greenspan came up for 
reappointment during Clinton's first term, his reputation was 
not as solid as it would become: Some observers (including some 
members of the administration of the elder George Bush) blamed 
Greenspan for the recession of 1990-91.  Moreover, Greenspan was 
a conservative Republican.  It would have been natural for 
Clinton to want to put a more Democratic stamp on the nation's 
central bank.  That he chose not to do so is notable.  To the 
extent that Greenspan's Fed has been a success, the Clinton  
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administration deserves some of the credit. 
The Clinton administration also influenced monetary policy 
with its other appointments to the Board of Governors.  These 
included Alan Blinder, Ned  Gramlich, Lawrence Meyer, Alice 
Rivlin, and Janet Yellen.  Compared to the typical appointment 
to the Fed by other presidents, the Clinton appointees were more 
prominent within the community of academic economists.  Some 
observers may applaud Clinton for drawing top talent into public 
service (while others may decry the brain drain from academia). 
 Whether this had any effect on policy is hard to say. 
In addition to appointments, the administration also made a 
significant policy decision: Throughout its eight years, it 
avoided making public comments about Federal Reserve policy.  
Given the great influence the Fed has on the economy and the 
great influence the economy has on presidential popularity, 
presidents and their subordinates usually have a tough time 
remaining silent about monetary policy.  Yet the Clinton 
administration avoided this temptation. 
A large academic literature indicates that more independent 
central banks produce lower and more stable inflation without 
greater volatility in output or employment.  One contributor to 
this literature was Lawrence Summers, who would later spend 
eight years as a high Treasury official in the Clinton  
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administration, culminating in the position of Treasury 
Secretary.
9  Thus, it is hardly an accident that the Clinton 
administration was unusually respectful of the Fed's 
independence.  What effect this had on policy is hard to gauge. 
 Perhaps the administration's restraint made it easier for the 
Fed to raise interest rates when needed without instigating 
political opposition.  It may also have made it easier for the 
Fed to cut interest rate when needed without sacrificing 
credibility in the fight against inflation.  In this way, the 
administration's respect for Fed independence may have 
contributed to the increased responsiveness of interest rates to 
inflation.  If so, the White House again deserves some credit 
for the Fed's success. 
 
4. Is There a Greenspan Legacy? 
In May 1964 the Journal of Finance published a short paper 
by a young economist named Alan Greenspan.  It was called 
"Liquidity as a Determinant of Industrial Prices and Interest 
Rates."  Greenspan began his summary of the paper as follows: "I 
have endeavored to integrate several theoretical approaches to 
the forecasting of prices, with special emphasis on its relation 
to interest rates." 
    The paper was a sign of things to come in several ways.   
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First, and most obviously, it showed Greenspan's early interest 
in liquidity, inflation, and interest rates--topics that are the 
essence of monetary policy.  Second, the paper demonstrated his 
interest in looking intensely at the data to try to divine 
upcoming macroeconomic events.  According to all staff reports, 
this has also been a hallmark of his time at the Fed. 
Third, the desire to integrate various points of view shows 
a lack of dogma and nimbleness of mind.  Without doubt, these 
traits have served Greenspan well in his role as Fed chairman.  
They have made it easier to get along with both Republican and 
Democratic administrations and to forge a consensus among open-
market committee members with their differing theoretical 
perspectives.  They have also made it easier for him to respond 
to economic circumstances that are changing, unpredictable, and 
sometimes inexplicable even after the fact. 
But there may also be a fourth, less favorable way in which 
Greenspan's paper presaged the author's later career: It left no 
legacy.  According to the online Social Science Citation Index, 
the paper was cited in the subsequent literature exactly zero 
times.  This raises the question of whether the monetary policy 
of the 1990s faces a similar fate.  Will Greenspan's tenure as 
Fed chairman leave a legacy for future monetary policymakers, or 
will the successful policy of the Greenspan era leave office  
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with the man himself? 
Imagine that Greenspan's successor decides to continue the 
monetary policy of the Greenspan era.  How would he do it?  The 
policy has never been fully explained.  Quite the contrary: The 
Fed chairman is famous for being opaque.  If a successor tries 
to emulate the Greenspan Fed, he won't have any idea how.  The 
only consistent policy seems to be: Study all the data 
carefully, and then set interest rates at the right level.  
Beyond that, there are no clearly stated guidelines. 
There is a great irony to this.  Conservative economists 
like Milton Friedman have long argued that discretionary 
monetary policy leads to trouble.  They claim that it is too 
uncertain, too political, and too inflationary.  They conclude 
that monetary policymakers need to be bound by some sort of 
monetary policy rule.  This argument is the economic counterpart 
to John Adam's famous aphorism that "we are a nation of laws, 
not of men." 
These views, together with the great inflation of the 1970s, 
have influenced central banks around the world.  Although no 
country has yet replaced its central bankers with computers 
programmed to an automatic monetary rule, as the most extreme 
critics suggest, there has been movement away from giving 
central bankers unconstrained discretion.  During the 1990s,  
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many nations adopted some form of inflation targeting.  In 
essence, inflation targeting is a commitment to keep inflation 
at some level or within some narrow range.  It can be viewed as 
a kind of soft rule, or perhaps a way of constraining 
discretion.
10 
Despite this environment, and the fact that a prominent 
conservative headed the U.S. central bank, the Fed during the 
1990s avoided any type of commitment to a policy rule.  
Conservative economists are skeptical about policies that rely 
heavily on the judgments of any one man.  But that is how 
monetary policy was made over this decade, and it was hailed as 
a success by liberals and conservatives alike. 
As a practical matter, Fed policy of the 1990s might well be 
described as "covert inflation targeting" at a rate of about 3 
percent.  That is, if the Fed had adopted an explicit inflation 
target at the beginning of the 1990s, the rest of the decade 
might not have been any different.  The virtue of eschewing such 
a policy framework is that it kept options open--as 
unconstrained discretion always does.  The downside is that it 
is makes it harder for subsequent Fed chairmen to build on the 
legacy of the 1990s, because it is hard to know what that legacy 
is.  
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5. The Lessons of the 1990s 
This paper has covered a lot of ground.  So I finish by 
summarizing four key lessons for students of monetary policy. 
 
1. The macroeconomic performance of the 1990s was exceptional.  
Although the average levels of inflation, unemployment, and real 
growth were similar to what was experienced in some previous 
decades, the stability of these measures is unparalleled in U.S. 
economic history. 
2. A large share of the impressive performance of the 1990s was 
due to good luck.  The economy experienced no severe shocks to 
food or energy prices d uring this period.  Accelerating 
productivity growth due to advances in information technology 
may also have helped lower unemployment and inflation.  
 
3. Compared to previous eras, monetary policy during the 1990s 
adjusted interest rates more aggressively in response to changes 
in core inflation.  This prevented spiraling inflation.  
Increased stability in monetary aggregates played no role in the 
improved macroeconomic performance of this era. 
 
4. The low inflation and economic stability of the 1990s shows 
that discretionary monetary policy can work well.  Yet it leaves  
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only a limited legacy for future policymakers.  U.S. monetary 
policymakers during the 1990s may well have been engaged in 
"covert inflation targeting" at a rate of about 3 percent, but 
they never made that policy explicit.  
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  ENDNOTES 
 
                         
1. See Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996). 
2. Blinder (1979) offers a classic analysis of the stagflation 
of the 1970s, emphasizing the role of supply shocks related to 
food and energy. 
3. Some of these ideas are explored in a recent paper by 
Laurence Ball and Robert Moffitt (2001). 
4. I say "allegedly" because it is not obvious whether 
Volcker's professed interest in the monetary aggregates was 
genuine or just a political feint to distract attention from 
the very high interest rates he needed to disinflate. 
5. "Greenspan Upbeat on U.S. Economy," Financial Times, 
February 20, 1993. 
6. My discussion of interest rates in this section and the 
next one builds on John Taylor's seminal work on monetary 
policy rules.  See, for instance, Taylor (1999). 
7. See Stock and Watson (1999). 
8. The Greenspan Fed deviated from this formula during the 
late 1980s, when interest rates rose substantially more than 
the formula recommended.  Arguably, the formula did the better 
job, and the actual policy was the mistake leading to the 
1990-91 recession. 
9. The Greenspan Fed deviated from this formula during the 
late 1980s, when interest rates rose substantially more than 
the formula recommended.  Arguably, the formula did the better 
job, and the actual policy was the mistake leading to the 
1990-91 recession. 
10. See Bernanke and Mishkin (1991) for a discussion of 
inflation targeting. Figure 1.
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